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Abstract: On the 24th February 2019 took place the parliamentary elections in the Republic of 
Moldova. Parliamentary elections represent one of the most important components of the political 
process. The distinct particularity of these parliamentary elections was determined by the fact that 
they took place, for the first time, in a mixed electoral system: 50 deputies were chosen on party lists, 
and 51 deputies in some uninominal constituencies. The changes of the electoral system are examined 
and the consequences of the implementation of the new system for the evolution of political processes 
in the Republic of Moldova. 
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1. The Context of the Parliamentary Elections from the 24th of 
February, 2019 
In democratic societies, the representativeness is ensured through elections. 
Elections, in a narrow sense, are the election by voters of their representatives in a 
body of power. Broadly speaking, the elections have a multifunctional character: a) 
allow citizens, through voting, to exercise the right to participate in the 
government, either directly, or through the elected representatives, b) give 
legitimacy to the power realization system, c) select the elites and political leaders, 
d) is a collective act, that results in the approval of the team, e) allow the electorate 
to participate directly in the socio-political life of the society by voting the electoral 
programs of the candidates (the electorate includes all citizens with the right to 
vote), f) allow voters to express their opinion on the activity of the political parties 
in power; confirm or deny the activity of the elected (Iancu, 1998, p. 58). 
Electoral systems, according to K. Benoit, fundamentally shape political party 
systems, not only determining mechanically how many and what kind of parties 
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win seats, but also shaping parties through psychological incentives they exert on 
party elites and voters who anticipate their operation (Benoit, 2007, p. 363). 
In the opinion of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice 
Commission), the democracy is inconceivable in the absence of elections held in 
accordance with certain principles that give them the status of democratic elections. 
But the truly democratic elections can be carried out, only if certain fundamental 
conditions of a democratic state, based on the pre-eminence of law, are met: 
fundamental rights, the stability of electoral law and effective procedural 
guarantees (Codul bunelor practice/Code of good practices, 2002). 
The Moldovan parliamentary elections from February 24, 2019, were characterized 
by a number of peculiarities, that present an interest from the theoretical, practical 
and technical perspective.  
On July 20, 2017, the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova approved the Law 
no. 154, which essentially changed the electoral system by moving from the 
proportional voting system to a mixed one (Lege nr. 154, 2017). According to the 
explanatory statement, the purpose of changing the electoral system was to 
combine the advantages of the majority and proportional system. In accordance 
with stated rationale of this reform, the amendments are aimed to:  
- Bring a remedy to the concerns on the perceived distance between elected 
representatives and their constituents; 
- Help identify and develop new political leaders that will diversify political 
leadership and improve the national decision-making process; 
- Provide fair representation of all citizens in Parliament, including those from the 
Transnistrian region and those from abroad (Venice Commission, 2017). 
The law was approved with the vote of 74 out of 101 deputies, members of three 
parliamentary fractions: the Democratic Party of Moldova, the European People’s 
Party and the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova. The law was passed 
with procedural breach (the voting procedure lasted only four minutes) and with a 
minimum of transparency (the final draft was published with only 24 hours before 
the vote). Moreover, the adoption of this law is a defiance of the opinion of the 
Venice Commission, which in its notification on the electoral system reform in the 
Republic of Moldova (Venice Commission, 2017) provided that before the 
realization of the electoral reform, it should be implemented the recommendations 
that were made in 2013, where were proposed to change the legal norms regarding 
the political parties and the financing of electoral campaigns (Venice Commission, 
2013). The Venice Commission concluded that under the existing conditions in the 
Republic of Moldova, the modification of the electoral system is not advisable, but 
the European Union has asked Chisinau to comply with the Commission’s 
conclusion. On May 3, 2017, two parliamentary groups of the European Parliament 
Vol. 9, No. 1/2019 
 71 
launched a joint call, condemning the intention to change the electoral system in 
the Republic of Moldova: “Any attempt to bring about such a change without the 
full backing of the opposition and of civil society will lead the EPP and ALDE to 
demand that all European funding be stopped”(Joint Statement EPP-ALDE, 2019). 
Also, the initiative to modify the electoral system was criticized by the opposition 
and civil society, which organized protests against these changes.  
The shortcomings of the mixed electoral system, invoked during the public debates 
are summarized as follows:  
- distorts the parliamentary representativeness (ideological, gender, selective 
ethnic representation); 
- favours the parties in the government “with much money”, that will 
weaken the party system;  
- governing parties will have additional levers to apply pressure on any 
unsuitable candidate for them; 
- the government will be able to “draw” electoral constituencies as they like, 
in order to increase its chances of winning; 
- unclear provisions on the vote of citizens from the Transnistrian region; 
- the diaspora’s voice will be annihilated;  
- the experience of the neighbouring countries or close to the Republic of 
Moldova (Romania, Ukraine, Georgia) had unsuccessful experiences with the 
uninominal system (Tăbârță, 2017, p. 9).  
The change of the electoral system took place in the conditions of a regression of 
the democracy in the Republic of Moldova. In 2019, Moldova was ranked the 79th 
place, according to the Democracy Index, published by the Economist. Moldova 
shares this place with the Republic of Fiji. If until 2016, the Republic of Moldova 
was, also, a part of the group of states with imperfect democracy, from 2017, it was 
demoted in the group of countries with hybrid regimes, which is 6 points lower 
(see the Chart no.1)  
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Chart no. 1. Democracy Index for the Republic of Moldova 
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit`s Democracy Index. 
https://infographics.economist.com/2018/DemocracyIndex/ (accessed on 5th July, 2019) 
The Democratic Development Index developed by Freedom House of the Republic 
of Moldova for 2018 is 4.93 points out of 7 (1 = Most Democratic, 7 = Least 
Democratic)(Nations in Transit, 2018). But according to the ranking for 2019, 
made by the World Justice Project, an independent multidisciplinary organization, 
aiming to advance the rule of law around the world, the Republic of Moldova is 
ranked the 83th place, out of 126 countries (Rule of Law Index, 2019).  
The Republic of Moldova has also been remarked by the high degree of corruption. 
According to the data provided by the Transparency International the Corruption 
Perceptions Index for the Republic of Moldova is worrying. The evolution of the 
Corruption Perceptions Index in the period 2014 – 2018 is presented in the Chart 
no. 2:  
 
Chart no. 2. Corruption Perceptions Index for the Republic of Moldova (2014-2018) 
Source: https://www.transparency.org/country (accessed on 11th July, 2019) 
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The high level of corruption in the Republic of Moldova presents a real danger to 
its European path and prevents the democratic development of the country.  
It should also be noted that the preparations for the implementation of the new 
electoral system took place, when the political dialogue between the Republic of 
Moldova and the European Union entered a complicated phase after the 
invalidation of local elections in June, 2018 in Chisinau. On the 5th of July, MEPs 
adopted a resolution for the suspension of macro-financial assistance for the 
Republic of Moldova due to the non-compliance with the political preconditions 
stipulated in the EU – Moldova Memorandum of Understanding, signed at the end 
of 2017 and the invalidation of local elections in Chisinau. The Resolution also 
stated that any decision on future payments should be made only after the 
parliamentary elections in February 2019, provided that they will be carried out in 
accordance with internationally recognized democratic standards (European 
Parliament, 2018).  
 
2. The Particularities of the Electoral Scrutiny from the 24th of 
February, 2019 
As a result of changes made to the electoral system, the essential differences 
between the 2019 parliamentary elections and the 2014 elections, can be 
summarized as follows:  
- The proportional electoral system was replaced by the mixed electoral 
system (50 deputies elected on party lists and other 51 in uninominal 
constituencies);  
- The concomitant organization of elections and the consultative Republican 
referendum (the consultation included two problems: reducing the number of 
deputies from 101 to 61 and the possibility of revoking the deputies (elected in 
the uninominal constituencies), who fail to fulfil their obligations); 
- Limiting the possibility for independent candidates to apply only in the 
uninominal constituencies; 
- Providing a minimum of 40% women’ presence on party-lists;  
- The lack of election validation threshold;  
- Election agitation allowed on election day; 
- Introduction of mandatory integrity certificate;  
- The physical presence of the candidates at the registration for participation 
in elections;  
- Prohibition of voting with expired IDs.  
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The Central Electoral Commission announced on December 10, 2018, that total 
number of voters, registered in the State Register of Voters (SRV) at that date, was 
3.265.997. Out of the total number, only 2.824.874 of voting citizens were assigned 
to administrative-territorial units of level 2. The difference includes persons, who 
have citizenship of the Republic of Moldova, but do not have residence visas, 
including those, who have authorized emigrated abroad (210.890 of persons) and 
citizens with the right to vote, having their registered residence in the 
administrative-territorial units on the left bank of the Dniester River, provisionally 
being outside the sovereign control of the constitutional authorities of the Republic 
of Moldova (230.233) (Total Number, 2018).   
15 electoral competitors were attended the regular parliamentary elections from 
February 24, 2019: 14 parties and one electoral bloc, consisting of two political 
parties, which is 1/3 of the number of parties, registered in the Republic of 
Moldova. In order to gain access to the Parliament, the political parties had to 
exceed the electoral threshold of 6%, and the electoral blocs – 8%. From those 15 
electoral competitors, 4 were parliamentary parties and 11 extra-parliamentary 
ones. From those 4 parliamentary parties, the Democratic Party of Moldova (DPM) 
was in power, but other 3 represented the parliamentary opposition – the Party of 
Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), the Party of Communists of the 
Republic of Moldova (PCRM) and the Liberal Party (LP). Another two 
parliamentary parties (the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (LDPM) and the 
European People’s Party of Moldova (EPPM)) did not registered, as separate 
entities, in the electoral competition.  
Compared to the previous parliamentary election, the number of parties, 
participating in the elections, was smaller: 15 versus 23. It should be noted, that at 
each of the 8 parliamentary scrutiny from the period of independence of the 
Republic of Moldova, political parties participated from 10 to 33, either by itself or 
within the electoral blocs. 
As the classification of electoral competitors according to the doctrinal guidelines 
is not relevant for the Republic of Moldova, they should be grouped according to 
Moldovan usage and realities. As a general rule, the segmentation of the Moldovan 
society takes place mainly on the basis of identity criteria, of ethno-linguistic 
belonging, which largely determines the geopolitical preferences of those social 
groups. The social-economic problems are outpaced by the identity and 
geopolitical factors. These factors are constantly being explored by political 
parties, who drawn up their messages and electoral offers, considering these 
particularities. As a rule, the left-wing parties, who share the socialist doctrine, are 
also supporters of Eurasian integration. The conservative right-wing parties, plead 
for European integration and/or for the reunification of the Republic of Moldova 
with Romania. On the centre-left and centre-right segments are the parties that, 
although have geopolitical preferences, usually focus on solving some economic 
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and social problems.  
In the electoral race on uninominal districts have registered 321 of electoral 
competitors, 57 of which, were independent candidates and 264 with political 
affiliation. The majority of candidates for the deputy function, 13 people, is 
attested on the uninominal district no. 50 (Western countries) and on uninominal 
constituency no. 51 (USA and Canada). The less 3, were registered in the 
uninominal district no. 4, Riscani city (In the constituencies of the elections, 2019).   
Those 51 uninominal districts were constituted as follows: 48 on the territory of the 
country: North: 1-12; Centre: 13-38; Chisinau municipality: 23-33; South: 35-44; 
Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia: 45-46; Transnistria: 47-48.  Abroad – 49 
(Eastern countries), 50 (Western countries), 51 (USA and Canada) city (In the 
constituencies of the elections, 2019). In Russia and in the Eastern countries were 
created 27 polling stations, in the EU and Western countries – 83 and 15 stations 
for USA and Canada (Mîndru & Peru-Balan, 2019, p. 107). Although the number 
of polling stations created abroad in the last elections (national and presidential) 
indicates an upward trend (see the Chartno.3), this fact still does not fully 
guarantee the right to vote of those close to one million Moldovan citizens abroad.  
1.457.220 million voters participated in the election (49,22% of total number of 
voters) (Minute, 2019), with 192.182 voters less than in parliamentary elections in 
2014 (1.649.402) (The results of the ellections, 2014). Neither the populist policies, 
introduced by the government in 2018, nor the consultative referendum on 
reducing the size of the parliament, which took place concurrently with the 
elections, had a major impact on stimulating the participation of citizens in the vote 
(Cenusa, 2019). 
Chart no. 3. Number of polling stations outside the country 
Source: Mîndru, V. & Peru-Balan A. (2019) Impactul votului mixt asupra calității clasei 
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politice din Republica Moldova (Impact of the mixed vote on the quality of the political 
class in the Republic of Moldova). Revista de Filosofie, Sociologie şi Ştiinţe Politice, nr. 1 
(179), p. 107. 
At these parliamentary elections has been attested the lowest attendance since the 
declaration of independence until now, a situation reflected in the Chart no.4.  
 
Chart no. 4. The rate of participation in parliamentary elections in the Republic of 
Moldova 
Source: The Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Moldova. 
http://www.cec.md;http://www.e-democracy.md (accessed on 6th July, 2019) 
The determining factor that influenced the upward decrease in the participation rate 
is the low level of confidence of the population in Parliament and Government. 
This phenomenon increased the segment of the indecisive people, who 
subsequently become the absentees (Mîndru, & Peru-Balan, 2019, p. 111).  
 
3. Election Results and Qualitative Composition of the New Parliament 
The results of the parliamentary elections from the 24th of February, 2019 are 
presented in Table no. 1.  
Table no. 1. The results of the parliamentary elections from the 24th of February, 2019 
Electoral competitors 
Obtained 
votes, 
% 
The number of obtained mandates The total 
number of 
mandates 
National 
constituency 
Uninominal 
constituency  
Socialists Party 31,15 18 17 35 
Democratic Party 23,62 13 17 30 
Bloc ACUM („Now”) 26,84 14 12 26 
Shor Party 8,32 5 2 7 
Independent candidates - - 3 3 
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Source: The Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Moldova. 
https://a.cec.md/ro/au-fost-confirmate-rezultatele-alegerilor-parlamentare-din-24-
februarie-2781_92724.html (accessed on 6th of June, 2019). 
One of the arguments for implementing the mixed electoral system was that new 
people, directly delegated by the citizens, will come to the Parliament. We find that 
out of those 101 deputies, elected in the new Parliament, 43 had a parliamentary 
experience. The most “long-lived” deputy is a democrat, Dumitru Diacov – the 
21st year of office. He is followed by democrat Vladimir Vitiuc, who has been a 
member of the Parliament since 2005.  
Each third member of the newly elected Parliament is a lawyer, but every fourth – 
an economist. Among the deputies of the Parliament of the X legislature are 
teachers, engineers, historians, doctors, journalists, agronomists, managers. In the 
Parliament will also activate an architect, a diplomat, a military and a specialist in 
Dramatic Arts. Also, according to a statement issued by the Parliament, 14 deputies 
hold the PhD degree in Sciences. The average age of the new members of the 
Parliament is 48 years old: the oldest deputy will soon turn 80, but the youngest, 
Dinu Plangau, is only 24 years old. For the first time, 59 deputies have access in 
the Parliament (Mîndru & Peru-Balan, 2019, pp. 110-111). 
 
4. The Consequences of Applying the Mixed Electoral System 
The introduction of the mixed electoral system in the Republic of Moldova has 
generated a series of consequences that we will present below.  
The modification of the electoral system, mainly benefited the parties with non-
transparent financing and with generous administrative and financial resources, 
thus contributing to the distortion of the proportionality of the votes obtained by 
the electoral competitors and the distribution of seats in the Parliament. The mixed 
electoral formula has largely favoured the Democratic Party, which, with 23,63% 
of votes, obtained 30 seats in the Parliament. At the same time, the mixed system 
clearly disadvantaged the Bloc “NOW”, that, with 26,84% of votes obtained only 
26 mandates. Even, if it mobilized the massive administrative resources, this score 
can not be explained otherwise by fraud of a significant percentage of votes (8 – 
10%) (Goșu, 2019). 
Although, the PSRM obtained the highest electoral score (31,15%) and the highest 
number of mandates (35 deputies), it proved to be the big loser of the mixed 
electoral system, which, due to the configuration of the uninominal constituencies, 
lost the priority in regions that are considered loyal to the pro-Russian left-wing 
parties (Mogîldea, 2019). The Russian factor and votes in the Transnistrian 
separatist region, where 33 029 voters voted for the first time, did not have the 
necessary strength to ensure a majority of the Socialists in the newly elected 
parliament. The voters in the separatist region voted both dimensions of the mixed 
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system. They supported, in particular, the Socialists on the party lists – 17 021 
votes, and voted for two independent candidates, who will represent the region. 
According to Armand Goșu opinion, the PSRM did not even want to win the 
elections. The PSRM is a multi-role party: it has the role of legitimizing the 
regime, the political system; to scare the West with the Russian threat and, at the 
same time, to give Moscow the illusion, that it won in the near abroad, successfully 
combating the pro-European parties (Goșu, 2019). 
As anticipated M. Bakken and Ad. Sorescu, the majority system in a poll, has 
changed the way, how voters choose candidates (Bakken & Sorescu, 2017). In 
addition to the fact that the image and reputation of the candidate matters more 
than in the proportional system, the new electoral system has determined the voters 
to resort to the so-called “useful vote”, that is, the vote expressed not necessarily in 
favour of the most preferred candidate, but in favour of one of those who are more 
likely to win.  
Within the uninominal constituencies, the candidates of the political groups have 
reoriented their electoral discourse from the issues of “national interest”, to those 
of local interest (the local infrastructure problems), even if their solution is not 
within the competence of a deputy.  
The introduction of the electoral system led to a change in the criterion for creating 
the electoral constituencies: from the territorial administrative to the territorial 
demographic one, which favoured the emergence of the ethno-political electoral 
entities. Article 80 of the Electoral Code provides that: “f) the uninominal 
constituencies, in which the national minorities live compact, will be constituted 
taking into account both their interests and the boundaries of the respective 
administrative-territorial units; and g) the uninominal constituencies from the 
Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia will be constituted so as not to exceed 
the administrative boundaries of the autonomy, at the same time, these 
constituencies will not be able to be supplemented with localities outside the 
autonomy, taking into account the risk of diluting the national minority” (Codul 
Electoral, 1997).  
The political, social, cultural and institutional realities of the Moldovan society 
were not considered at the implementation of the mixed electoral system: the 
mixed system was used for the election of a unicameral parliament in a multi-party 
system, which includes 46 political parties.  In the uninominal constituencies, the 
deputy mandate was obtained with 30 – 40% of the number of participants in the 
elections. But in two constituencies, the mandate was obtained with a number of 
votes below 30%: Dumitru Diacov (DPM) in constituency no. 40, Cimișlia – 
27,3%, and Efrosinia Grețu (DPM) in constituency no. 41, Leova – 28,4%. 
Only in 7 uninominal districts were obtained the mandates with the votes of more 
than 50% of the number of voting participants (the constituencies 17 and 18, where 
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V. Plahotniuc and Il. Shor have run, the constituencies 44 and 45 from Gagauzia 
and constituencies 46, 47, and 48 from Transnistria).  
In many cases, the mandates were obtained with a difference of only a few hundred 
votes against the candidates: in the constituency no. 11 Falesti – 374 of votes, in 
the constituency no. 40 Cimislia – 172 of votes, in the constituency no. 4 Rascani – 
170 of votes, in the constituency no. 26 Chisinau municipality – 138 of votes and 
in the constituency no.42 Cahul – 65 of votes (Scaned Minutes, 2019). 
One of the important problems that needs to be solved is to determine how to 
include the diaspora in the electoral processes in the Republic of Moldova, as long 
as almost one million Moldovans are abroad. In the elections of February 24, 2019, 
in the constituencies, outside the country, the number of voters, who participated in 
the voting was 76 583 (district no. 49 – 7.750, district no. 50 – 64.271 and district 
no. 51 – 4.562) (The map of the results, 2019). And in these elections, the state did 
not provide these citizens of the Republic of Moldova with conditions to exercise a 
fundamental right – the right to vote and the right to be elected.  
Although the new electoral system introduced the possibility of revoking the 
elected members in the uninominal districts, the Venice Commission considers 
that, this provision contravenes the international standards and the provisions of 
article 68, par. 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, by which the 
imperative mandate is prohibited (Venice Commission, 2017). 
 
5. Conclusions  
Political forces in the government, without taking into account realities of the 
Moldavan society and rules of the democratic society, imposed the mixed electoral 
system, which is an inappropriate combination of elements from both electoral 
systems. This artificial electoral construction, without scientific argumentation, 
will not solve the problems of representativeness and will not contribute to the 
development and consolidation of democracy in the Republic of Moldova.  
The reason for changing the electoral system was the political interest of the ruling 
party (DPM). The introduction of the majority system on uninominal 
constituencies in a state divided by identity and geopolitical criteria, which does 
not control the whole territory and with a massive population exodus across the 
country, carries major risks.   
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